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Abstract 
 
 The prominent Babies R Us decision (McDonough et al., v. Toys R US, Inc., 
2009) was the first to explore the economic consequences of resale price maintenance 
after the Supreme Court’s Leegin Decision.  Previously, litigation concerned the presence 
or absence of an agreement; but that changed with the new jurisprudence which instead 
emphasized the restraint’s direct anti-competitive effects.  While the district court’s 
decision in the Babies R Us case rested on the factual circumstances of the case, it did not 
have before it an economic model through which those facts could be integrated.  This 
paper offers such a mode, the predicates of which are drawn from the case. The 
conclusions that are drawn from the model are fully consistent with the court’s decision           
 
 
 
 
 
 
I Introduction 
 
 The Leegin decision of 2007 changed the course of antitrust jurisprudence with 
respect to resale price maintenance (RPM) in an essential way.  No longer would the 
critical issue be whether an agreement existed between supplier and distributor to set 
resale prices as it had been for decades.  Ever since the Dr. Miles decision of 1911, these 
restraints have been evaluated under Section 1 of the Sherman Act, which required a 
combination or agreement among the parties for a violation to be found.  In the presence 
of the per se rule established in the Dr. Miles decision, the only remaining issue was 
whether Section 1 could be applied, so that is where the battles were fought. 
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 All this changed post-Leegin as attention was redirected at the actual 
consequences of the restraint.  The parties were now directed towards specifying the 
gains and losses from the restraint so that economic analysis would assume a more 
consequential role.  From the start, the Court acknowledged that RPM could have 
different competitive effects depending on the market circumstances in which it was 
applied (Leegin, 2007).  This recognition was evident in Justice Kennedy’s majority 
opinion.  He reserved one section for circumstances where the benefits from the restraints 
would exceed their costs and the following one for the reverse. 
 In large measure, Justice Kennedy relied on various economic studies that 
detailed the ways in which the gains resulting from RPM exceeded their costs.  Many of 
these studies provided economic models in which RPM could be used to create more 
efficient distribution systems.  However, when he turned in the opposite direction, he had 
less to rely upon.  Although there were numerous reports of RPM’s leading to higher 
prices and exclusionary outcomes, there were fewer formal models that specifically 
detailed the anti-competitive consequences of vertical price restraints.  Even the leading 
text on antitrust economics (Blair and Kaserman, 2nd ed., 2009, p. 373) merely noted the 
leading defect of RPM was its use to facilitate price-fixing arrangements. (Comanor, 
2011)     
 In this paper, we seek to fill this void.  Our purpose is to present a formal model 
of supplier–distributor interactions in which both the gainers and losers from RPM are 
identified.  This model like all others must rest on structural predicates.  Rather than 
simply adopting a pro forma underlying structure, as is generally done, we take our 
predicates from those present in a prominent post-Leegin RPM decision which involved  
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Babies R Us (BRU) (McDonough et al. v. Toys R Us, Inc,, 2009).  The model itself has 
similar implications to that developed by Asker and Bar-Isaac (2014).  However, in their 
model, an upstream firm uses RPM to exclude rivals, while in the one developed here, a 
dominant distributor employs RPM to exclude downstream rivals.  In that regard, we 
follow an earlier model put forth by Comanor and Rey (2000).        
 That case is described in some detail in a recent paper (Comanor, 2013) so there 
little need to repeat that discussion.  Instead it is sufficient for our purposes to describe 
the contours of the market structure within which RPM was practiced.  Suppliers of 
strongly branded and highly priced baby products interacted with a dominant distributor 
that accounted for large proportions of their products’ sales.  Although these suppliers 
typically faced competition from generic rivals, there were reasons to conclude, and the 
judge so ruled, that those products were sold in separate and distinct markets. 
At the same time, the dominant distributor faced competition from a group of 
rivals that employed a new technology, the Internet.  These rivals had lower costs due to 
the new technology and were therefore able to charge lower prices for the same products.  
However, many consumers had strong preferences for using the established distributor, 
which offered certain services that the new rivals could not provide.  
 There was also evidence, which was noted in Judge Brody’s decision, that the 
dominant distributor coerced its principal suppliers to impose RPM so that the rival 
distributors would not set prices below those that were charged by the dominant 
distributor.  If such lower prices were set, product shipments would be discontinued, as in 
fact occurred.  Although the suppliers may have preferred to have the alternate 
distributors actively selling their products, they were unwilling to jeopardize their 
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distribution arrangements with the leading distributor.  And in the end, they imposed 
RPM limitations on the new distributors.  
 In her decision, the Judge referred twice to a particular passage from the Leegin 
decision: 
A dominant retailer, for example, might request resale price maintenance to 
forestall innovation … that decreases cost.  A manufacturer might consider it has 
little choice but to accommodate the retailer’s demands for vertical price restraints 
if the manufacturer believes it needs access to the retailer’s distribution network. 
(Leegin, p. 893) 
 
While this passage suggests circumstances where enforcing RPM may have strong anti-
competitive consequences, it hardly represents a detailed economic model.   
In the section below, we offer just such a model.  The essential actors are a 
monopolistic supplier, a dominant distributor, and a fringe of rival distributors.  Not only 
does this fringe behave as perfect competitors but to be relevant in the market, its 
members must also have lower costs than their more dominant alternative.  However, the 
fringe faces a structure of demand where some consumers strongly value the services that 
are offered by the dominant distributor and are willing to pay a premium to obtain their 
product from that source rather than the fringe.  
Finally, we assume - again following the circumstances of the case - that arbitrage 
prospects make it infeasible to charge different prices to the fringe distributors than to the 
dominant outlet.   In effect, the upstream supplier is unable to practice price 
discrimination.     
 In the following section, we develop an economic model in which these sets of 
actors interact.  Of course, much rests on the structure of consumer preferences for the 
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services that are offered by the two sets of distributors.  However, all that is assumed is 
that consumers exhibit a wide range of preferences for the services that are offered.    
 
II        A Model of Suppliers and Distributors 
 At this point, we propose a simple model of supplier-distributor incentives that is 
designed to capture the critical features of the BRU decision that was discussed earlier.  
In this model, a single upstream supplier, U, produces a highly valued product.  U can 
distribute its product to final consumers through a downstream dominant distributor, A, 
or through a large group of smaller distributors, B.  We assume that the B firms together 
represent a competitive fringe and are all price-takers.   
 At the heart of the model are the presumed factors that distinguish the B firms 
from A.  The former group of firms offer a different set of distribution services from A 
and in doing so bear lower costs: Ɣb < Ɣa ; constant costs prevail for all distributors.   
 However, consumers differ in their evaluation of these services; some are willing 
to pay substantially more for the services offered by A but not all are.  To some 
consumers, A offers superior distribution services, and they will not purchase the product 
without the services, but to others, A’s services are indistinguishable from those that are 
offered by the B’s.  There is thus a distribution of consumer preferences on how much 
they are willing to pay for their ability to purchase U’s product at A rather than through 
one of the B’s. 
 Let the preferences for the value of the product absent the distribution services be 
denoted by t, and assume that the preferences are distributed between 0 and T according 
to the density function, f(t) and the cumulative distribution function F(t).  While t is a 
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variable that indicates individual customer types, let ơ be a parameter that measures the 
premium associated with A’s distribution services such that t(ơ – 1) is the additional 
value and tơ is the total value of U’s product that is purchased from A rather than from 
one of the B’s.  Thus, ơ is a fixed value that indicates the average willingness of 
consumers to pay for enhanced distribution services (those provided by A), which in turn 
varies across consumers according to the distribution of t.  
A critical feature of the model is that the price that is charged by U -- indicated by 
W and paid by both A and the B’s -- is constrained to be the same.  As mentioned, even 
though the demand elasticities may differ as between sales made to A and the B’s, we 
assume that arbitrage prospects are too great to permit price discrimination to occur.  
Downstream prices are Pa and Pb, with Pb = W + Ɣb since the fringe firms are competitive 
and simply pass on the upstream price along with their costs to consumers. However, 
since Pb depends on W, which is endogenous, both final prices are also endogenous.   
A consumer of type t will purchase the product from A even when Pa > Pb so long 
as 
 
(1) tơ  -  Pa   ≥  t  -  Pb   =   t  -  (W  +  Ɣb). 
 
The inequality in (1) is reversed for lower type consumers who then purchase the 
upstream product from a B distributor except for those with such low valuations that        
t < Pb.  In that case, the consumer does not purchase the product at all.   
 Under these assumptions, the structure of demand that faces the A distributor is 
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(2) Da      =   Q [ 1 – F((Pa – W–Ɣb  )/  (ơ – 1) )]     if  ơPb < Pa  ≤ Tơ and (Pa - Pb) /(ơ-1) 
≤T 
   Q [ 1 – F(Pa /  ơ) ]                         if  Pa < ơ Pb  and Pa < Tơ 
   0          otherwise. 
 
In what follows, we let Q and T, which are both scaling parameters, be equal to one for 
simplicity.  Note that the demand conditions that face A are influenced by Pb which in 
turn depends on W.  At some point, lower values of W lead to reduced demand at A as 
customers switch away from him and purchase U’s product instead from the B’s.  
Therefore, lower values of W have divergent implications for A’s profits; they reduce B’s 
prices and shift customers away from A, but they also reduce A’s marginal costs and lead 
to increased sales by lowering A’s optimal price for given demand.  
Note also that when Pa  ≤  Pb  +  t(ơ-1), all sales are made by A and none by the 
B’s even if marginal consumers treat all distributors the same.  Despite B’s lower costs, 
consumer preferences are such that they lead to purchases being made entirely from A 
even when A sets a somewhat higher price to reflect its inherent advantages.  The B’s 
attract customers only when they have a price advantage from doing so.  
 Consider the demand schedules that are represented in Figure 1.  The first of these 
schedules -- D1D -- rests on the assumption that W and Pb already have been determined 
while Pa continues to vary.  For values of Pa that are equal to or below the fixed value of 
Pb, adjusted for A’s preferential status, the two demand schedules coincide which is 
consistent with B’s sales being zero.  However, where Pa exceeds that critical value, sales 
made by the B’s increase and those made by the A distributor declines.  A’s operable 
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demand schedule is then D2D.  In contrast, if the B’s were excluded from the market, or 
alternatively if Pb is always set equal to or less than [Pb  +  t(ơ-1)], which here leads to the 
same result, the demand schedule facing A is represented by D1D.   
 We model the decision process as sequential: First the upstream supplier (U) sets 
a price, W, to reflect the anticipated demand for U’s product from both sets of 
distributors.  The upstream supplier’s choice of W determines Pb equal to W + Ɣb; and 
then with Pb determined, A sets Pa.  To be sure, the A distributor may not accept U’s 
favored price and seek a different one.  However, A’s efforts here are compromised by 
the recognition of both parties that lower values of W lead to lower values of Pb and thus 
increased competition from the alternate distributors.  Instead, we presume that A’s 
bargaining power is directed towards achieving the imposition of RPM, as will be 
discussed below. 
Note that as Pb varies in response to different values of W, the position of the kink 
in A’s demand schedule shifts.  The kink rises along the D1 segment as Pb increases, and 
declines along the D segment as Pb declines.  Although A’s revenues expand along the D1 
segment, its costs also increase since higher values of W lead to increased marginal costs.  
 To derive A’s optimal strategy for given W, consider its profit function: 
 
(3)       Πa (W, Pa) = (Pa – Ɣa   - W) Da = (Pa – Ɣa - W) [1 – F((Pa – Ɣb  - W) / (ơ – 1))] 
 
so long as B’s sales are positive. Otherwise,  
 
(4)       Πa (W, Pa) = (Pa – Ɣa   - W) [ 1 – F(Pa / ơ )] 
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Where both types of distributors are active, equation (3) above is the relevant expression 
for A’s profits.  The supplier price, W, has two effect:  first, an increase in W reduces A’s 
profit per unit, (Pa – Ɣa - W); but second, an increase in W can increase A’s market share, 
[1 – F((Pa – Ɣb  - W) / (ơ – 1))], as  ∂Da / ∂W = (1) / [ơ – 1)]F’((Pa – Ɣb  - W) / (ơ – 1)) > 
0.   Thus, ∂Пa / ∂W can be either positive or negative.  However, A always benefits from 
lower values of W if the B’s sales are otherwise foreclosed.  	
 Consider now the position of the upstream supplier, U.  Its profits depend of 
course on revenues and costs.  By assuming that U’s costs are entirely fixed, we direct 
attention to U’s revenues, which depend on both his price, W, and its quantities sold.  The 
latter are affected by its distribution arrangements and expanded when both sets of 
distributors are active.  Although the absence of B’s can be countered by a sufficiently 
low value of Pa, such that quantities are maintained, that is not so for the absence of A 
which attracts a loyal customer base.    
 Consider the supplier, U’s, profit function: 
 
 (5)       Πu (W) = W [1 – F(W + Ɣb )] 
 
where Pa > Pb + t(ơ-1) so that both A and  B distributors compete.  Otherwise, the B 
distributors are absent from the market in which case     
 
(6)       Πu (W) = W [1 – F(Pa/ơ)]. 
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Whether (5) or (6) applies can depend on the valuation factor, ơ, which is available for 
the preferred distributor.  When the B’s are absent, U will seek the highest possible price 
of W that is consistent with A remaining in business.  On the other hand, when both A 
and the B’s are present, U sometimes prefers a lower value of W.  U and A therefore can 
have either conforming or conflicting incentives in setting W when the B’s are actually or 
potentially present.      
Recall Figure 1.  At the kink, the relevant marginal revenue schedule is 
discontinuous so there are strong prospects that A’s optimal price is reached at point R.  
Whenever A’s price exceeds that found at R, it is losing sales to its rivals; this is a 
problem that can be countered only by setting a lower price.  For relatively modest 
marginal costs, it is optimal for A to set the entry-excluding price at the equilibrium point 
R.  
At a higher value of its marginal cost, however, A’s preferred price may be 
reached at a point such as S. Much depends on the value of W.  An increased value of W 
will shift the kink higher on the D1D demand curve but also increase A’s marginal costs 
and thereby increase the likelihood that A’s price is reached along the relevant D2 
demand segment.  Both outcomes are possible.  An important feature of the model is that 
U typically gains from making sales through both types of distributors, while A’s profits 
are limited to his own sales.   
As mentioned earlier, we have assumed that U sets W before A determines Pa.  In 
other words, we have let A set his price after U has already done so.  In different 
circumstances, however, when these decisions are made both simultaneously and 
independently, then U will set W in order to extract as much profit as possible given A’s 
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choice of Pa.  So long as the B’s remain in the market, the Nash equilibrium value of W is 
the same in both the simultaneous and sequential move games.  In both cases, W is set to 
maximize expression (5) above.  Furthermore, if A’s price is at the kink, small changes in 
W will not affect A’s decision.   
However, if at the sequential move equilibrium, A’s price would allow him to 
earn positive profits, then U’s optimal value of W in the simultaneous move model would 
be higher.  This result in turn would lead to still higher final prices, although there would 
remain the classic successive monopoly problem leading to prices that are above those 
that an integrated monopolist would charge (Waterson, 1980; Salinger, 1988; Lemley and 
Shapiro, 2006).    
 
III The Imposition of Resale Price Maintenance 
To derive explicit results, we assume that f(t) is uniform in some interval  [0,T].  
In that case, F(t) = 1/T, which is here assumed equal to one.  The applicable demand 
structure is then: 
 
(7) Da      =   {1 – [(Pa - W - Ɣb )  /  (ơ – 1)]         if    ơ ≥ Pa  ˃ ơPb 
            and 1 ≥ (Pa – Pb)  / ( ơ – 1) 
 
 {1 – (Pa / ơ)}                                if    Pa < ơ Pb and Pa < ơ 
      otherwise. 
 
In this case, the relevant demand curves are linear, as represented in Figure 2.  
The kink noted there is reached when the quantities indicated in the two expressions 
above are equal, which occurs when Pa = ơ (W + Ɣb ) = ơ Pb.  The associated quantity 
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demanded is Da = [1 – (W + Ɣb) / 1].  As noted earlier, the kink’s position depends on the 
value of W as set by U so that the outcomes indicated in Figure 2 presume a pre-
determined value of W. 
 Subject to this caveat, the outcomes noted in Figure 2 depend on marginal costs.  
At MC, where the relevant schedule passes through the discontinuity in the MR schedule, 
A’s profit-maximizing position is reached at point R, where A accepts a lower premium 
to expand his sales volume by excluding the B’s.  However, with higher marginal costs, 
indicated here by MC', A accepts the presence of the B’s in order to set a higher price: 
here indicated by point S.  
 Determining which cost schedule applies depends on the input price, W, along 
with distribution costs, Ɣa.  As described earlier, we model W as set by the upstream 
supplier to maximize net revenues.  On the assumption of a uniform distribution of 
relevant preferences across consumers, we have: 
 
(8) Πu (W) = W [1 – (W + Ɣb) / 1]. 
 
With both A and B distributors present, net revenues are maximized at a fixed value of W 
that is equal to [1 – Ɣb] / 2.  In this case, both Ɣa and Ɣb impact A’s price.   
 A’s profits are affected by both demand and cost conditions.  Depending on its 
costs, A can either accept B’s presence by setting a higher price, or alternatively seek to 
exclude the B’s by reducing its price.  However a further option presents itself.  If the B’s 
can be excluded by other means, such as by having an external constraint imposed that Pb  
must equal or exceed Pa , then A can operate along the D1D demand schedule rather than 
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the D2D demand schedule in Figure 2.  In that case, A’s optimal price is set at either 
points such as V or V’ along the D1 demand segment. 
Imposing this additional constraint on the B distributors is tantamount to an RPM 
regime where rival distributors are required to set prices that are equal to or above those 
set by the dominant distributor.  This would enable the distributor to set a higher price 
because it now does not need to fix a lower price to impede sales by the B distributors.  A 
can then reach a point such as V rather than R, or a point such as V’ rather than S.  
When RPM is imposed and the B distributors are thereby foreclosed from the 
market, U’s profit function is now: 
 
(9) Πu (W) = W [ 1 – (ơ + Ɣa + W) / 2 ơ ]   
 
with W now equal to [ơ – Ɣa  / 2]. In the new circumstances, with A facing fewer 
competitive pressures, U can take some advantage of A’s new posture.  It can raise its 
price, W, to compensate partially for selling fewer units.  The resulting impact of RPM 
on U’s revenues depends on the relative values of Ɣa , Ɣb and ơ.            
 As suggested in Figure 2, there are two cases to consider:  In the first, Case I, the 
relevant marginal cost schedule passes through or below the discontinuity in the operative 
marginal revenue schedule, which leads to an equilibrium position at the demand 
schedule’s kink, at point R.  In this case, it is optimal for the dominant distributor to 
reduce his price sufficiently to exclude the B firms from the market.  However, if RPM is 
imposed, which has the effect of excluding the B rivals, A can then set a higher price and 
increase its profits to an outcome such as at point V.  Alternatively, if costs are higher as 
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in Case II, A can avoid competition from the B’s, and RPM permits him to shift from 
point S to point V’.  
Points R, V and V’ all lie along the D1D inverse demand schedule: 
 
(10) Pa = ơ (1 – Qa), 
 
where Qa  is the quantity that A chooses to sell.   
At point R, Pa = ơ Pb = ơ (W + Ɣb ); while at points V and V’, Pa = [ơ + W + Ɣa]/2, 
although at different values of Ɣa.  In contrast, point S lies along the D2D inverse demand 
schedule at  
 
(11) Pa = [(ơ – 1) + Ɣa + Ɣb ] / 2} + W.   
 
 Where RPM arises in circumstances that are broadly consistent with this model, it 
apparently results from pressures from large distributors.  Indeed, in the model that is 
offered here, at least with plausible parameter values, the returns from RPM accrue to 
large distributors.  With very high values of ơ, however, the upstream supplier may prefer 
to sell only through the dominant distributor, and so the fringe firms become irrelevant, 
as does RPM.  Of critical importance, therefore, are the conditions likely to make these 
pressures for RPM effective.   
 A common feature of the distribution sector is that large-scale distributors often 
sell very large number of products, all made by different suppliers.  In contrast, suppliers 
often focus on a smaller number of items.  In such circumstances, the failure to reach an 
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agreement between them will have a greater proportional impact on the supplier’s 
revenues than on the distributor’s revenues; consequently, the distributor’s bargaining 
power can be relatively strong.  Of course, this may not be true on all cases; in particular 
where a supplier’s product is essential to the distributor’s market position.  An important 
feature of the model that is outlined here is that RPM is more likely to arise when the 
distributor’s buying power is sufficiently strong so as to permit him to impose its will on 
its suppliers.   
 In this regard, note the following result.  For Case I above, maximizing joint 
profits simultaneously for both U and A implies: 
 
(12) Pa = ơ (1/2 + Ɣa/2). 
 
Alternatively, with the sequential decision making process that was outlined originally, 
the classic successive monopoly problem arises with the resulting final price: 
 
(13)  Pa = ơ (3/4 + Ɣa/4). 
 
Consistent with the standard result, the presence of successive monopolies leads to higher 
final prices.  This result suggests that if U and A were to negotiate parameter values 
between themselves, they might agree to a lower value of Pa than is suggested here.  That 
type of agreement, however, would not be stable without direct transfers from A to U as 
joint profit maximizing requires that U set W equal to zero. 
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IV Policy Conclusions 
This model illustrates how RPM can be used to eliminate competitive forces from 
the marketplace.  In some circumstances, such as the one that is represented by Case I 
above, potential competition is reduced.  In others, such as is indicated in Case II, actual 
competitors are eliminated.  In either case, the remaining supplier and distributor react by 
setting higher consumer prices.   
RPM can have the effect of imposing restraints such that lower cost distributors 
cannot exploit their positions by charging lower prices.  Instead, they are required to set 
the same prices as their higher-cost rivals so their competitive advantage is removed.  
Consumers are harmed as a result.  In effect, what this model demonstrates is that intra-
brand competition in some circumstances cannot be divorced from inter-brand 
competition, but rather they jointly determine market results.                 
 While decisions on whether or not to impose RPM turns on negotiations between 
suppliers and major distributors, the interests of consumers are not represented.  Even if 
many consumers are willing to pay for the distribution services that are offered by major 
distributors, many are not willing to pay very much for those services; but with the 
imposition of RPM, the latter are forced to pay more for the enhanced distribution 
services or not have the product.  In the model that was offered above, these consumers 
are mainly those who would prefer to obtain the product from one of the B outlets.  
Strikingly, without RPM, and so long as distribution costs at major distributors are 
modest, the resulting final prices will not reflect the major distributor’s costs but rather 
the lower costs of their alternatives.  It is only the presence of RPM that frustrates that 
result.    
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 Although there are surely instances where RPM serves consumer interests, the 
model proposed here, which rests on realistic market conditions, suggests that these 
restraints can be employed for the benefit of large distributors and used to increase final 
prices and restrict outputs. 
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